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"… early intervention to equalize allocation may  
be a more cost-effective way of promoting equity  
than compensating for unequal outcomes."  
J. Currie (2001, p.216) 
 
1.   Introduction 
  A high correlation between parent and child educational outcomes typically generates 
low intergenerational income mobility. While there is substantial scientific interest in 
comparing intergenerational mobility across societies we still know very little about its 
determinants.
1 Past research found institutional features such as a high age at school tracking 
to increase educational mobility (Bauer and Riphahn 2006, Hanushek and Wößmann 2006). 
Yet substantial mobility differences exist across institutional regimes with similar tracking 
ages. This study proposes the age at school entry as an additional determinant of educational 
mobility and measures its causal effect in the institutional framework of Switzerland.  
  Our research question differs from a literature which studies the effect of age at 
school entry on pupils' educational performance (e.g. Angrist and Krueger 1992, Currie 2001, 
Bedard and Dhuey 2006). These analyses do not consider the potential ramifications of the 
age at school entry for intergenerational education transmission. However, Currie (2001) 
points to the beneficial equity effect of an early start of general schooling which balances 
educational endowment differences across pupils more effectively than a system where 
public education starts later in a child's life. We test whether this equity advantage of early 
intervention is reflected in the extent of intergenerational educational mobility. – To our 
knowledge this is the first study to analyze the intergenerational mobility effect of the age at 
school entry.  
  We apply data on educational outcomes within a single country, i.e. Switzerland. This 
                                                 
1 For a comparative study on income mobility see e.g. Solon 2002, for a comparison 
of education mobility see e.g. Chevalier et al. (2003) or Shavit and Blossfeld (1993).  
 
avoids problems inherent in cross-national comparisons where more than one institutional 
feature differs across comparison groups and may determine the outcome of interest. We 
identify the causal effect of the age at school entry on educational mobility based on 
institutional differences across the Swiss federal cantons. The Swiss educational system is 
organized at the cantonal level. Probably for historical reasons the 26 cantons impose 
different regulations regarding age of school entry within otherwise comparable institutional 
frameworks.  
 
2.   Data and Empirical Approach 
  We apply cross-sectional data from the 2000 Swiss population census. The dependent 
variable indicates the type of secondary training a youth receives at age 17 in categories of 
high (college-bound), medium (advanced vocational), and low (only mandatory) levels of 
secondary schooling (for details see Bauer and Riphahn 2007). We similarly categorize 
parental education.
2 To measure the magnitude of intergenerational education transmission we 
evaluate the probability that children attend high level (i.e. college-bound) secondary 
schooling given their parents' education. 
  In our sample of 62,535 Swiss born youths we observe vast differences in the 
probability of attaining high level secondary education by parental educational background: 
among children of  fathers with low education about ten percent attend high secondary 
education. Among the children of highly educated fathers this holds for more than sixty 
percent. 
  To investigate the role of the age at school entry we use information from a survey of 
cantonal education departments where we collected information on the typical age at school 
                                                 
 
2 We consider five education indicators for each parent: high, middle, low, no 
information provided, parent missing (i.e. single parent household).  
 
entry for the early 1990s. 18 of the 26 cantons clearly stated age 6 (11 cantons) or age 7 (7 
cantons) as the regular age of school entry, the other 8 cantons provided age ranges.
3 In order 
to illustrate the validity of our identifying assumption we compare the average characteristics 
of cantons with early and late age of school entry in Table 1. Only few characteristics differ 
significantly for the two groups of cantons. While some indicators suggest higher overall 
educational attainment in cantons with early school enrolment, cantons with late school 
enrolment spend a higher share of the public budget on education. Overall, these figures do 
not cast doubt on our identification strategy.  
   Table 2 describes the probability of high child secondary schooling given fathers' 
education in cantons with early (age 6) and late (age 7) school enrolment. The table separately 
considers age at entry based on interval midpoints (MID), the earliest (EARLY) and the latest 
(LATE) school entry ages. A comparison across columns yields that the probability of high 
(i.e. college-bound) child education increases when fathers are of high, rather than low 
education (cf. columns 1 and 2). A comparison across rows yields that this difference in the 
probability of high education varies depending on the age at which children enter school. The 
differences in the absolute probabilities are mostly insignificant and suggest that early school 
entry reduces mobility (cf. column 4). We find a significant increase in the relative difference 
across parental education if the separation is taking place later, rather than earlier, across all 
three indicators (cf. column 5). 
  We test whether educational mobility responds to age at entry when controlling for 
composition effects. We estimate flexible multinomial logit models which regress youth 
educational outcome (Y) on parental education (PE) and control for a large number of 
                                                 
3 In our baseline estimations we apply the given ages at school entry and use the 
midpoint (MID) where intervals were provided. In robustness tests we investigate whether our 
results are sensitive to the coding of the age at entry variable and distinguish results when 
using only the lower (EARLY) or upper (LATE) bound of the age at entry interval.  
 
household, parental, regional, and individual characteristics (X), as well as for an indicator of 
the age at school entry (Entry).
4 The model is completed by interaction terms of parental 
education and the age of school entry (PE @ Entry):  
      Y = a + b PE + c0 X + c1 Entry + d (PE @ Entry) + ,, (1) 
      M Y /  M PE = b + d Entry  (2) 
  A jointly significant coefficient vector "d" suggests that the impact of parental 
education indeed varies depending on the age at school entry. In order to evaluate the age of 
entry effect we use the estimation results to predict the probability of college-bound (high) 
secondary schooling for children of parents with high and low education. A difference-in-
differences type comparison of the probabilities in situations of early and late school entry 
then indicates the relevance of the age at entry for educational mobility. 
 
3.   Findings 
  The estimation results are not presented to save space (available from the authors upon 
request).
5  Table 3 describes the probabilities which are predicted based on estimated 
coefficients (see columns 1-3). For robustness checks the estimations were performed 
separately for indicators of the midpoint of the age range of school entry (Panel A: MID), the 
earliest age of school entry (Panel B: EARLY), and the latest possible age of school entry 
(Panel C: LATE). In all three cases the eight coefficients "d" of the interaction terms (PE @ 
Entry) (see equation 2) were jointly statistically significant at least at the five percent level. 
                                                 
4 The empirical model controls for a total of 8 indicators of paternal and maternal 
education, a total of 20 indicators of paternal and maternal occupational position, age of father 
and age of mother, 4 indicators of religion, 4 indicators of the number of siblings, 6 region 
indicators, population density in the area of residence, sex of the child, indicator of late school 
entry and 8 interaction terms of late school entry and parental education. 
5 A Hausman test indicated that the IIA assumption of the multinomial logit estimator 
cannot be rejected in our data.  
 
Thus the correlation between parent and child education appears to be significantly modified 
by the timing of tracking.  
  In column 4 (7) Table 3 provides the absolute difference in the predicted probabilities 
of children with high and low (middle) educated fathers to attain the highest secondary school 
degree. Column 10 (13) provides the relative differences. The subsequent columns provide p-
values for tests of the hypotheses that these probability differences differ across age of school 
entry regimes. In all cases the probability difference increases with higher age at school entry. 
The relative differences are more often statistically significant than the absolute differences. 
The evidence does not allow us to reject the hypothesis that early age at entry yields higher 
intergenerational mobility. 
  In Bauer and Riphahn (2006) we showed, that the age of tracking pupils in ability-
based streams of secondary school significantly affects intergenerational mobility. As the 
tracking age constitutes another difference across Swiss federal cantons we need to determine 
whether the effect of age of school entry on intergenerational educational mobility is robust to 
controls for the age of tracking. In additional estimations we controlled for whether a canton 
follows an early or a late tracking regime and reevaluated the effect of the age at school entry. 
Our results are unchanged, early age at school entry has beneficial and robust effects on 
educational mobility even conditional on the age of tracking. 
 
4.   Conclusion 
  Based on a literature that investigates the educational attainment effects of age at 
school entry we hypothesize that early schooling contributes to reduce intergenerational 
educational transmission and to increase educational mobility. This positive effect of early 
entry is confirmed in our analysis which takes advantage of institutional differences across 
Swiss cantonal education systems. The approach is similar to a difference-in-difference  
 
estimation and identifies the causal effect of age at entry if there are no unobservable mobility 
differences between cantons that are correlated with age at entry. 
  This is the first test of the effect of age at school entry on educational mobility. It is 
particularly reliable, as it operates within a given national institutional framework and thus is 
unaffected by other institutional differences that hamper studies which apply international 
comparisons to identify the effect of interest. 
 
References 
Angrist, Joshua D., and Alan B. Krueger, 1992, The Effect of Age at School Entry on 
Educational Attainment: An Application of Instrumental Variables with Moments 
from Two Samples, Journal of the American Statistical Association 87(418), 328-336. 
 
Bauer, Philipp and Regina T. Riphahn, 2006, Timing of school tracking as a determinant of 
intergenerational transmission of education, Economics Letters 91, 90-97. 
 
Bauer, Philipp and Regina T. Riphahn, 2007, Intergenerational Transmission of Educational 
Attainment: Evidence from Switzerland on Natives and Second Generation 
Immigrants, Journal of Population Economics 20(1), 121-148. 
 
Bedard, Kelly and Elizabeth Dhuey, 2006, The Persistence of Early Childhood Maturity: 
International Evidence of Long-Run Age Effects, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
121(4), 1432-1472. 
 
Chevalier, Arnaud, Kenny Denny, and Dorren McMahon, 2003, A multi-country study of 
inter-generational educational mobility, ISSC Discussion Paper 2003/06, Dublin. 
 
Currie, Janet, 2001, Early Childhood Education Programs, Journal of Economic Perspectives 
15(2), 213-238. 
 
Hanushek, E.A. and L. Wößmann, 2006, Does educational tracking affect performance and 
inequality? Differences-in-differences evidence across countries, Economic Journal 
116 (510), C63-C76. 
 
Müller Kucera, Karin and Martin Stauffer, 2003, Wirkungsvolle Lehrkräfte rekrutieren, 
weiterbilden und halten. Grundlagenbericht Schweiz, Schweizerische 
Koordinationskonferenz Bildungsforschung, Aarau. 
 
Shavit, Yossi and Hans-Peter Blossfeld (eds.), 1993, Persistent Inequality. Changing 
Educational Attainment in Thirteen Countries, Westview Press: Boulder et al. 
 
Solon, Gary, 2002, Cross-Country Differences in Intergenerational Earnings Mobility, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(3), 59-66.  
 
Table 1  Mean characteristics of cantons with early and late age of school entry 
 
Mean in early Mean in late
 school enrolment  school enrolment
 cantons  cantons
Population share: tertiary degree  0.048 0.043 0.598
Population share: advanced school degree 0.095 0.086 0.584
Population share: no more than mandatory schooling 0.246 0.240 0.697
Advanced school graduations 2000 / 1000 inhabitants 2.338 1.923 0.071 +
University graduations 2000 (in 1000 inhabitants) 1.298 1.058 0.115
Education expenditures per capita (in Swiss Francs) 2602.8 2635.0 0.843
Share of education expenditures in public expenditures 0.271 0.288 0.366
Average teacher salary in primay schools 100.50 100.88 0.912
Average teacher salary in secondary schools 102.60 96.419 0.087 +
Performance based teacher pay (5=high, 1 = low) 2.154 3.385 0.016 *
Primary teacher probability of job change (in percent) 3.846 3.077 0.435
Secondary teacher probability of job change (in percent) 5.077 2.923 0.055 +




Source: Own calculations based on population census 2000 and Müller Kucera and Stauffer 




Table 2   Observed probability of child high secondary education by paternal education 
and cantonal age at school entry 
 
Abs. Diff. p-value Rel. Diff. p-value
3456
(A) MID
enrolment: 6 0,155 (0,007) 0,689 (0,010) 0,534 0,068 4,44 0,000
enrolment: 7 0,067 (0,005) 0,575 (0,012) 0,508 8,53
(B) EARLY
enrolment: 6 0,130 (0,005) 0,652 (0,007) 0,522 0,177 5,03 0,000
enrolment: 7 0,067 (0,005) 0,575 (0,012) 0,508 8,53
(C) LATE
enrolment: 6 0,175 (0,007) 0,698 (0,009) 0,523 0,266 3,99 0,000
enrolment: 7 0,078 (0,004) 0,592 (0,008) 0,514 7,63




Note: P (high | low) describes the probability that children of fathers with low education 
pursue the high secondary track, the other probabilities similarly condition on fathers' 
education. Standard errors are in parentheses, the p-values apply to one sided tests of the null 
hypotheses that the absolute and relative differences across school entry regimes are identical. 
  
 
Table 3  Predicted probability of child high secondary education by parental education and cantonal enrolment regime 
 
12 34 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
P(high | 
low)
P (high | 
mid)
P (high | 
high)
















p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value
(A) MID
enrolment: 5 0,202 0,359 0,646 0,443 0,287 3,193 1,801
(0,133) (0,171) (0,174) (0,092) (0,068) (1,635) (0,549)
0,169 0,047 0,062 0,052
enrolment: 6 0,115 0,258 0,616 0,501 0,233 0,358 0,083 5,346 0,066 2,391 0,051
(0,088) (0,147) (0,176) (0,113) (0,071) (2,890) (0,872)
0,333 0,138 0,071 0,052
enrolment: 7 0,061 0,176 0,583 0,522 0,407 9,544 3,317
(0,052) (0,118) (0,180) (0,141) (0,091) (5,461) (1,388)
(B) EARLY
enrolment: 5 0,174 0,323 0,671 0,497 0,348 3,852 2,075
(0,125) (0,169) (0,170) (0,095) (0,071) (2,256) (0,779)
0,395 0,257 0,060 0,034
enrolment: 6 0,105 0,241 0,618 0,513 0,487 0,377 0,328 5,895 0,061 2,561 0,030
(0,084) (0,146) (0,179) (0,119) (0,075) (3,383) (0,999)
0,601 0,411 0,066 0,030
enrolment: 7 0,060 0,174 0,560 0,500 0,387 9,339 3,225
(0,052) (0,120) (0,186) (0,147) (0,094) (5,263) (1,266)
(C) LATE
enrolment: 5 0,162 0,304 0,575 0,413 0,270 3,550 1,888
(0,087) (0,147) (0,179) (0,126) (0,087) (4,675) (1,245)
0,026 0,029 0,254 0,202
enrolment: 6 0,112 0,248 0,591 0,479 0,001 0,342 0,000 5,283 0,024 2,378 0,012
(0,088) (0,148) (0,182) (0,118) (0,074) (2,819) (0,843)
0,032 0,006 0,099 0,089
enrolment: 7 0,075 0,199 0,607 0,532 0,408 8,116 3,049
(0,067) (0,134) (0,179) (0,132) (0,084) (4,774) (1,291)
Relative Differences Absolute Differences
Note: P (high | low) describes the probability that children of fathers with low education pursue the high secondary track, the other probabilities similarly 
condition on fathers' education. In parentheses are bootstrapped standard errors, the p-values apply to one-sided tests of the null hypotheses that the 
absolute and relative differences (presented in columns 4, 7, 10 and 13) in the early enrolment regime are smaller than in the late enrolment regimes. 
Source: Own calculations based on Census 2000 and on a survey of cantonal education departments. CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
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